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DEATH MARKS THE SPOT: WHERE
PRESUMPTIONS AGAINST PRETRIAL RELEASE
LIVE IN NEW MEXICO LAW, AND WHERE THEY
SHOULD MOVE
Andrew J. Pavlides *

“Death’s a debt; his mandamus binds all alike—no bail, no demurrer.”
―Richard Brinsley Sheridan
ABSTRACT
Like other jurisdictions that have abolished the death penalty, New Mexico
no longer has true capital offenses, where the potential of execution is still a legal
punishment. The state has also undertaken cash bail reforms by enacting a
constitutional amendment that seeks to detain individuals who pose a risk of flight
or dangerousness, while never detaining anyone simply because they are financially
incapable of posting bond. But, unlike many of the jurisdictions that have ceased the
use of the death penalty and shifted away from cash bail, New Mexico approaches
the pretrial release process uniformly, making no distinctions between felony
offenses.
During pretrial release proceedings, presumptions that certain classes of
offenders pose a flight risk or a danger to the community, particularly those charged
with premeditated murder, are widely accepted and have been deemed
constitutionally sound by the United States Supreme Court. Since 2018, however,
New Mexico recognizes no presumptions that can be used in making pretrial release
determinations for those charged with first-degree murder, which involves a willful
and deliberate premediated killing. New Mexico’s failure to distinguish first-degree
murder from other felony offenses has resulted in calls by the public and lawmakers
to repeal the state’s bail reform amendment due to public safety concerns. This Note
argues that in order for New Mexico’s cash bail reforms to survive, the state should
employ rebuttable presumptions of flight-risk or dangerousness against defendants
charged with first-degree murder in pretrial detention hearings. This change would
address the concerns of lawmakers and residents, and put New Mexico more in line
with other bail reform jurisdictions.
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INTRODUCTION
Does the nature of first-degree murder somehow become less serious
simply because a state ceases the use of the death penalty? Perhaps inadvertently, the
New Mexico Supreme Court may have answered this question in the affirmative in
State v. Ameer. 1 First-degree murder is still statutorily categorized as a capital
offense in New Mexico, and involves one or more of the following: a premeditated
killing that is willful and deliberate, killing done while committing or attempting to
commit another felony offense, or killing done by an act that disregards human life. 2
However, in 2018, in addition to finding that capital offenses no longer exist in New
Mexico because the state no longer imposes the death penalty and declaring a
constitutional bail denial provision for capital cases moot, the court did away with
any presumption trial courts can use against defendants charged with first-degree
murder when considering pretrial release. 3
On March 19, 2017, Muhammad Ameer stabbed thirty-year old Aaron
Sieben in the middle of a busy Albuquerque, New Mexico intersection following a
fight at a gas station. 4 The altercation ended with Ameer fleeing the scene with
Sieben’s wallet, and Sieben bleeding out in the middle of the road, unable to be
revived. 5 Ameer was indicted for, and later convicted of, first-degree murder. 6
Pending trial, the prosecution sought to detain the defendant under a 2016 New
Mexico Constitutional Amendment that allows for pretrial detention in felony cases
“if the prosecuting authority . . . proves by clear and convincing evidence that no
release conditions will reasonably protect the safety of any other person or the
community.” 7 Presumably finding that the prosecution had not met this burden, the
judge nevertheless granted the pretrial detention motion, relying on the capital
offense exception that appears in the same section of the state constitution as the
2016 constitutional amendment and allows for detention pending trial in capital cases
“when proof is evident or the presumption great.” 8 The New Mexico Supreme Court
reversed the trial court, ordering that a finding based on something more than the
capital offense exception must be present in order to detain the defendant. 9 The court
later issued a precedential decision expanding on its earlier order and clarifying its

1. See State v. Ameer, 2018-NMSC-030, ¶ 3, NO. S-1-SC-36395, 2018 WL 1904680, at *1 (holding
that because capital punishment has been abolished in New Mexico, state courts may no longer use Article
II, Section 13 of the New Mexico Constitution which allows presumptions against the release of
defendants in capital cases for purposes of bail denial).
2. § 30-2-1(A).
3. See Ameer, 2018-NMSC-030, 2018 WL 1904680.
4. Elise Kaplan, Man Charged with Murder in ‘Senseless Crime’ at Gas Station, ALBUQUERQUE J.
(Mar. 20, 2017, 8:34 PM), https://www.abqjournal.com/972922/man-charged-with-murder-in-senselesscrime-at-gas-station.html [https://perma.cc/HX5P-ERAZ].
5. Id.
6. Katy Barnitz, Convicted Killer Sentenced to Life in Prison, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Sept. 25, 2018,
11:35 PM), https://www.abqjournal.com/1225520/convicted-killer-sentenced-to-life-in-prison-ex-manwas-found-guilty-in-2017-gas-station-stabbing-death.html [https://perma.cc/T5DJ-Q3U5].
7. N.M. CONST. art. II § 13; Ameer, 2018-NMSC-030, ¶ 6, 2018 WL 1904680, at *1.
8. N.M. CONST. art. II § 13; Ameer, 2018-NMSC-030, ¶ 6, 2018 WL 1904680, at *1.
9. Order, State v. Ameer, S-1-SC-36395 (N.M. May 8, 2017) (order reversing trial court pretrial
detention order based solely on capital offense exception).
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position that because the death penalty was abolished in 2009, there are no longer
capital crimes in New Mexico. 10
The result is that the capital offense bail denial exception cannot be used. 11
The consequence is that there are now no presumptions of dangerousness or flight
risk against defendants charged with first-degree murder. 12 New Mexico now has a
standard of pretrial release that views first-degree murder as indistinguishable from
any other felony. Indeed, the same standard of release is now applied uniformly to
all felony offenses. 13
This Note will argue that in order for New Mexico’s 2016 Constitutional
Amendment on cash bail reform to survive, the New Mexico Rules of Criminal
Procedure should be amended to trigger a rebuttable presumption against defendants
charged with first-degree murder for the purposes of pretrial release. Part I of this
Note will discuss the doctrine of presumptions in criminal law, and the competing
theories on why capital crimes have historically been deemed non-bailable. Part II
of this Note will analyze the use of presumptions in pretrial release proceedings in
other jurisdictions with bail reform measures similar to New Mexico’s, as well as
their use in the federal court system. Part III of this Note will take a critical look at
New Mexico’s current system of pretrial release. Finally, Part IV will survey the
effects a procedural rule change will have on pretrial release proceedings in New
Mexico, will scrutinize the proposals thus far to change the administration of pretrial
release as inadequate or overbroad, and will examine a legislative fix as an
alternative approach.
BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE
Pretrial release and cash bail reforms in New Mexico have been in the works
since at least 2014. Beginning with State v. Brown, and coming to a head with New
Mexico’s 2016 constitutional amendment allowing bail denial in certain cases, trial
courts worked with considerable difficulty to administer pretrial release. 14 Perhaps
this was rooted in an effort to balance perceived public safety concerns with the
language of the amendment. Maybe it was due to a lack of precedent setting cases
providing guidance. In either event, the New Mexico Supreme Court has issued at
least three precedential opinions concerning what courts may consider when denying
bail. 15
Pretrial detention has long been regarded as an Eighth Amendment
violation, particularly when it is the result of excessive bail, except in cases where
the accused is charged with a “capital crime.” 16 The most accepted definition of a

10. Ameer, 2018-NMSC-030, ¶ 73, 2018 WL 1904680, at *15.
11. Id. ¶¶ 70, 73, 2018 WL 1904680, at *15.
12. See N.M. CONST. art. II § 13; see generally Ameer, 2018-NMSC-030, 2018 WL 1904680.
13. See Ameer, 2018-NMSC-030, ¶ 73, 2018 WL 1904680, at *15.
14. N.M. CONST. art. II § 13; State v. Brown, 2014-NMSC-038, 338 P.3d 1276.
15. See Ameer, 2018-NMSC-030, 2018 WL 1904680; State ex rel. Torrez v. Whitaker, 2018-NMSC005, 410 P.3d 201; State v. Groves, 2018-NMSC-006, 410 P.3d 193.
16. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 72 (1951) (holding that defendants arrested for non-capital offenses are
entitled to affordable bail); see also Brown, 2014-NMSC-038, ¶ 53, 338 P.3d at 1292 (holding that
defendants who are not entitled to bail under the New Mexico Constitution should be detained). At the
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capital crime, and the one adopted by the New Mexico Supreme Court, is an offense
that carries a potential penalty of death. 17 However, even in jurisdictions where the
death penalty has been abolished or is no longer in use and cash bail reforms have
been embraced, a heightened presumption against the release of those accused of
murder or crimes of violence is permitted. 18 The same is true of the federal court
system. 19 It is unclear why presumption language is absent in New Mexico’s bail
reform amendment. It is possible that the drafters of the amendment felt it
unnecessary, as presumption language already appears in the same section of the
state constitution that addresses capital offenses, and they believed judges would still
be able to use it to deny bail to those charged with first-degree murder. 20
Until Ameer, judges were able to evaluate whether a presumption against
pretrial release was great enough against a defendant charged with first-degree
murder (the only statutorily defined capital felony in New Mexico) in making pretrial
release determinations. 21 New Mexico lawmakers, including the former and current
governor, have noticed the absence of any presumption that can be used against
defendants charged with first-degree murder and other serious violent offenses. 22 In
the event capital punishment is reinstated, the capital offense exception in Article II
of the New Mexico Constitution and the presumption language that accompanies it,
will escape obsolescence. 23 In the interim, proposals to address the concern regarding
the absence of any presumption have included amending New Mexico’s Constitution
again, which would require majority voter approval, or amending the New Mexico
Rules of Criminal Procedure that govern the administration of pretrial release
proceedings. 24 The more feasible solution is the latter, particularly because the
time of the Brown decision, the New Mexico Constitution allowed bail denial in capital cases and in some
other, limited situations.
17. Ameer, 2018-NMSC-030, ¶ 10, 2018 WL 1904680, at *2.
18. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321 to 1325 (West, Westlaw through Sept. 11, 2019); S.B. 10, 2017–
18 Sess. (Cal. 2018).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A)–(E) (2012); see also CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BAIL:
AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 9–11 (2017).
20. N.M. CONST. art. II § 13.
21. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(A) (2018); see Ameer, 2018-NMSC-030, ¶ 70, 2018 WL 1904680, at
*15.
22. See Fernanda Lopez, Lawmakers Talk Solutions to “Bail Reform” Constitutional Amendment
Problem, KRQE (Oct. 27, 2017, 12:56 PM), https://www.krqe.com/news/legislative-criminal-justicesubcommittee-discusses-bail-reform-friday/1009273582 [https://perma.cc/GS5Z-72U4]; Dan McKay &
Maggie Shepard, Gov. Martinez Calls for Repeal of Bail Reform Amendment, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Oct. 17,
2017, 9:26 PM), https://www.abqjournal.com/1079274/gov-martinez-calls-for-do-over-on-bail-reformamendment.html [https://perma.cc/TDN7-CG99]; Kai Porter, NM Lawmaker Wants to End “Catch and
Release” System, KOB (Aug. 18, 2018, 6:47 PM), https://www.kob.com/new-mexico-news/nmlawmaker-wants-to-end-quotcatch-and-releasequot-system/5033955/ [https://perma.cc/4BZN-QLZ4];
Chris Ramirez, Vote 4 NM: Gubernatorial Candidates Agree; Bail Reform is ‘Not Working,’ KOB (Oct.
29, 2018, 7:24 PM), https://www.kob.com/politics-news/vote-4-nm-gubernatorial-candidates-agree-bailreform-is-not-working/5125778/?cat=500 [https://perma.cc/FFX3-7URD].
23. See Ameer, 2018-NMSC-030, ¶ 68, 2018 WL 1904680, at *14 (stating that no branch of New
Mexico government can change the meaning of “capital offense” as that term is used in the state
constitution).
24. Dan McKay, Lawmakers Wrestle with New Bail System, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Sept. 7, 2018, 9:11
PM),
https://www.abqjournal.com/1218228/legislators-wrestle-with-changing-new-bail-system.html
[https://perma.cc/54HQ-DAFJ].
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proposed constitutional amendment is overbroad and undermined by public safety
research that supports attaching a rebuttable presumption only to crimes that
potentially expose a defendant by life imprisonment. 25 However, the rule
amendments proposed thus far are not analogous enough to the presumption
invalidated by Ameer. 26 The proposed amendments allow judges to make certain
inferences against a defendant for purposes of pretrial release only after the
defendant has been released on conditions while a felony case is pending and is
charged with another felony in the interim. 27
I. PRESUMPTIONS IN CRIMINAL LAW
A. Overview and Categories of the Presumption Doctrine
The high probability of an allegation’s truth, or the assumption that it is true
because of the existence of other facts, forms the basis for legal presumptions. 28 In
the criminal context, there are two overarching types of presumptions that are distinct
from one another because of the obligation each places on the factfinder. 29
Mandatory presumptions require the factfinder to affirmatively find the assumed
fact, whereas permissive inferences do not. 30 A third category of presumptions used
in criminal law are rebuttable presumptions. A rebuttable presumption is based on
inferences that are drawn from facts delivered by the prosecution that create a prima
facie case. 31 This type of presumption against a criminal defendant can be overcome
through a slight showing of evidence that weighs in the defendant’s favor. 32
The United States Supreme Court has dealt with criminal presumptions
primarily in the context of jury instructions. Specifically, when an instruction
effectively undermines the prosecution’s duty to prove each element of a crime
beyond a reasonable doubt by directing the jury to assume certain facts, it curbs the
jury’s duty to find that the prosecution has met this burden and is unconstitutional. 33
However, when an instruction merely allows jurors to rationally infer a causal
connection between a proven fact and the ultimate allegation, it is constitutional
because jurors are free to reject such an inference. 34
25. Matthew Reisen, Review Casts Doubt on DA’s Pretrial Detention Plan, ALBUQUERQUE J. (July
19, 2019, 12:10 AM), https://www.abqjournal.com/1342255/review-casts-doubt-on-das-bail-reformproposal.html [https://perma.cc/67LV-ERMB].
26. Ameer, 2018-NMSC-030, 2018 WL 1904680.
27. Leo M. Romero, Report and Recommendations of the Ad Hoc Pretrial Release Committee, N.M.
SUP. CT. AD HOC PRETRIAL RELEASE COMM. 13–14 (Aug. 3, 2018),
https://www.nmlegis.gov/handouts/CCJ%20090618%20Item%206%20Daniels%20%20Ad%20Hoc%20Bail%20Committee%20Rules%20Revision%20Report%20(8-3-18).pdf
[https://perma.cc/KMA4-KQDP].
28. Presumption, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
29. Cty. Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979).
30. Id.
31. Rebuttable Presumption, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
32. United States v. Stone, 608 F.3d 939, 945 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Stricklin, 932
F.2d 1353, 1355 (10th Cir. 1991) and United States v. Rodriguez, 950 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1991)); DOYLE,
supra note 19, at 10.
33. Allen, 442 U.S. at 156 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).
34. Id. at 157.
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B. Use of Presumptions in Pretrial Release Determinations
While presumptions during the factfinding stage of trial may not always be
constitutionally permissible, presumptions in the pretrial context are different. The
accused are protected by the “innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt” standard derived from the Due Process Clause during the factfinding stage. 35
During pretrial proceedings, however, the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Bail
Clause attaches, and the Supreme Court has recognized that not all offenses are
bailable. 36 The Court has therefore given deference to legislative bodies responsible
for passing statutes and promulgating regulations containing presumption language
that govern who is entitled to bail. 37 The type of presumption used in pretrial bail
proceedings varies, but rebuttable presumptions are quite common. 38
C. Presumptions in Capital Cases
There are two competing theories on why individuals charged with capital
crimes are often subject to pretrial detention. 39 The first revolves around the potential
of execution, rather than the nature of the crime. Labeled the “penalty theory,” this
view rests on the belief that the accused would rather flee and forfeit any required
appearance bond than face the possibility of a death sentence. 40 In contrast, the
“classification theory” is indifferent to the crime’s potential consequence, but
concerns itself with the nature of the offense. 41 Certain studies suggest that the
severity of a crime does not necessarily indicate whether a defendant will reoffend
or abscond while trial is pending. 42 While this certainly undermines the central view
of the classification theory, it does not unfailingly lend support to the penalty theory.
A reasonable inference can be made that a more severe sentence inevitably flows
from the conviction of a more serious offense.
Both of these theories illustrate why some courts have historically been
reluctant to release individuals charged with capital offenses, but they do not speak
to the use of presumptions in pretrial release. While some states, like New Mexico,
have only incorporated a presumption against defendants charged with capital crimes
into their constitutional bail provisions, some have taken the additional step of
incorporating a presumption against defendants charged with any number of
felonies. 43 Other jurisdictions attach rebuttable presumptions, through regulations,

35. See generally Winship, 397 U.S. 358.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545–46 (1952).
37. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987); Carlson, 342 U.S. at 545–46; see also
Stone, 608 F.3d at 945 (“[P]resumption[s] reflect Congress’ substantive judgment that particular classes
of offenders should ordinarily be detained prior to trial.”); DOYLE, supra note 19, at 4–5.
38. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2012); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321 (West, Westlaw through Sept.
11, 2019); S.B. 10, 2017–18 Sess. (Cal. 2018).
39. State v. Ameer, 2018-NMSC-030, ¶¶13–14, NO. S-1-SC-36395, 2018 WL 1904680, at *3.
40. Id. ¶ 13, 2018 WL 1904680, at *3; see also Ex parte Dennis, 334 So. 2d 369, 371 (Miss. 1976);
Roll v. Larson, 516 P.2d 1392, 1393 (Utah 1973); State v. Johnson, 294 A.2d 245, 250 (N.J. 1972).
41. Roll, 516 P.2d at 1393.
42. Curtis E.A. Karnow, Setting Bail for Public Safety, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 14–16 (2008).
43. N.M. CONST. art. II § 13; e.g., OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 9.
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to violent crimes and crimes where weapons are alleged to have been used. 44
Furthermore, although the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees a right to bail and the United States Supreme Court has generally held
that capital crimes are not bailable, the federal court system has also incorporated
presumptions into its pretrial release statutes for many crimes. 45 Presumptions
against certain classes of offenders are especially apparent in jurisdictions that have
shifted away from cash bail release systems. 46
II. USE OF PRETRIAL PRESUMPTIONS IN CASH BAIL REFORM
JURISDICTIONS AND FEDERAL COURTS
California and Washington, D.C. have moved away from cash bail, and
have embraced systems of pretrial release that detain defendants when certain criteria
are met. 47 In both of these jurisdictions, the guidelines for pretrial release include
rebuttable presumptions for certain offenses or in certain situations. 48 Both of these
jurisdictions are similarly situated to New Mexico in that the death penalty has been
statutorily abolished or is no longer in use. 49 This section will also analyze the federal
system of pretrial release, which relies on rebuttable presumptions in pretrial release
proceedings for certain offenses, is largely based on Washington D.C.’s system, and
has acted as a partial model for New Mexico. 50 It is important to note that while
rebuttable presumptions work against the defendant, they still require the prosecuting
authority to deliver facts that create a prima facie case. 51
A. Washington, D.C. Statutory Scheme
Washington, D.C. abolished the death penalty in 1981. 52 Since 1970, the
District has been using a statutory scheme that almost entirely rejects cash bail. 53
The statute requires courts to determine the defendant’s risk of flight and the danger
they pose to the community. 54 The court must then order release, release on

44. E.g., S.B. 10, 2017–18 Sess. (Cal. 2018).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(2)–(3), (f)(1)(A)–(E) (2012); United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 747–48 (1987); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545–46 (1952).
46. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322, § 23-1325 (West, Westlaw through Sept. 11, 2019); Cal. S.B.
10.
47. See generally § 23-1321 to 1325; Cal. S.B. 10.
48. § 23-1325; Cal. S.B. 10.
49. State and Federal Info District of Columbia, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/district-columbia
[https://perma.cc/N9ZA-M2EC];
John
Gramlich,
California is One of 11 States that Have the Death Penalty but Haven’t Used it in More Than a Decade,
PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/03/14/11-states-that-havethe-death-penalty-havent-used-it-in-more-than-a-decade/ [https://perma.cc/UMZ4-U56L].
50. § 3142(e)(2)–(3); State ex rel. Torrez v. Whitaker, 2018-NMSC-005, ¶¶ 46–47, 70, 410 P.3d 201,
209, 213.
51. Rebuttable Presumption, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
52. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 49.
53. PSA’s History, PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY FOR D.C., https://www.psa.gov/?q=about/history
[https://perma.cc/4E6L-LAZS].
54. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321 to 1325 (West, Westlaw through Sept. 11, 2019).
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conditions, or pretrial detention. 55 A rebuttable presumption is triggered in pretrial
detention hearings if the defendant is charged with first-degree murder, seconddegree murder, or assault with attempt to kill while armed if the defendant is
suspected to have committed the offense while armed with a firearm, or if a firearm
was readily available during the commission of the offense. 56 In Washington, D.C.,
first-degree murder involves a killing with malice aforethought involving
premeditation and deliberation. 57 The statute requires the prosecution to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant will not appear in court as ordered
or poses a risk to the safety of others or the community. 58
B. California Proposition
In August 2018, California passed a reform bill that seeks to completely do
away with cash bail. 59 California voters will have the opportunity to ratify the bill in
the 2020 general election. 60 Lawmakers in the state have sought bail reforms for
nearly forty years, and a 2018 California Court of Appeal decision allowed the
movement to gain steam. 61 The court’s decision declared the state’s system of
assigning money bonds based on the severity of the offense unconstitutional,
particularly when a high bond is effectively used as preventative detention because
the defendant is unable to pay. 62 The bill does not explicitly mention first-degree
murder, which is defined as “killing of a human being . . . with malice aforethought”
and statutorily continues to carry a potential penalty of death in California. 63
However, though the death penalty is still legal in California, the state has not
executed an individual convicted of a capital crime since 2006. 64 The bill employs a
rebuttable presumption in cases where the defendant is charged with a crime of
violence, is alleged to have made threats of violence, or was armed with or used a
deadly weapon at the time of the alleged offense. 65 The court must still determine
that clear and convincing evidence has been shown by the prosecution that no release
conditions will reasonably assure the safety of the public or the defendant’s
appearance in court. 66

55. Id.
56. § 23-1322, -1325.
57. § 22-2101.
58. § 23-1322.
59. Scott Wilson, California Abolishes Cash Bail, Aiming to Treat Rich and Poor Defendants
Equally, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/california-abolishescash-bail-aiming-to-treat-rich-and-poor-defendants-equally/2018/08/29/70891a9e-abad-11e8-b1daff7faa680710_story.html?utm_term=.423a6f827605 [https://perma.cc/JU4Y-QET6].
60. Michael McGouh, The Fate of California’s Cash Bail Industry Will Now Be Decided on the 2020
Ballot, SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 17, 2019, 11:58 AM),
https://www.sacbee.com/news/california/article224682595.html [https://perma.cc/2A8Q-RP58].
61. Wilson, supra note 59.
62. In re Humphrey, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 513 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018).
63. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 187(a), 190(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 860 of the 2019 Legis. Sess.);
S.B. 10, 2017–18 Sess. (Cal. 2018).
64. Gramlich, supra note 49.
65. Cal. S.B. 10.
66. Id.
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C. Federal Law
Congress noted the success of the pretrial release system used in
Washington, D.C. that detains certain defendants, and embraced a similar model for
use in United States Federal Courts in 1984. 67 These courts employ rebuttable
presumptions when determining pretrial release. 68 Rebuttable presumptions are
triggered either by specific offenses or other risks. 69 Offenses that will trigger a
rebuttable presumption in pretrial detention hearings include those that are of a
particularly violent nature, felonies where a dangerous weapon is alleged to have
been used, and crimes that are punishable by death or life imprisonment. 70 Though
the rebuttable presumption remains at work, the prosecuting authority’s prima facie
case against the defendant’s release must still meet the clear and convincing
evidentiary standard in order for the defendant to be detained pending trial. 71 The
federal model is among those cited by the New Mexico Supreme Court as support
for its pretrial release guidelines. 72
III. PRETRIAL RELEASE IN NEW MEXICO
The New Mexico Constitution, with limited exceptions, has guaranteed the
right to bail since it took effect when New Mexico achieved statehood in 1912. 73
Since adoption, it has always contained an exception for capital offenses. 74 It
previously included exceptions for felony cases where certain determinative criteria
were met. 75 Those exceptions were as follows:
Bail may be denied by the district court for a period of sixty days
after the incarceration of the defendant by an order entered within
seven days after the incarceration in the following instances:
A. the defendant is accused of a felony and has previously been
convicted of two or more felonies, within the state, which felonies
did not arise from the same transaction with the case at bar;
B. the defendant is accused of a felony involving the use of a
deadly weapon and has a prior felony conviction, within the state.
The period for incarceration without bail may be extended by any

67. Thomas C. French, Is It Punitive or Is It Regulatory? United States v. Salerno, 20 U. Tol. L. Rev.
189, 197 (1988).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(2)–(3) (2012); DOYLE, supra note 19, at 9–11.
69. § 3142(e)(2)–(3), (f)(1)(A)–(E), (f)(2); DOYLE, supra note 19, at 11.
70. § 3142(e)(2)–(3), (f)(1)(A)–(E); DOYLE, supra note 19, at 11.
71. United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Even in a presumption case, the
government bears the ultimate burden of persuasion by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
presents a danger to the community.”); DOYLE, supra note 19, at 10.
72. See State ex rel. Torrez v. Whitaker, 2018-NMSC-005, ¶¶ 46–50, 410 P.3d 201, 209–10; State v.
Brown, 2014-NMSC-038, ¶ 34, 338 P.3d 1276, 1287.
73. State v. Ameer, 2018-NMSC-030, ¶ 1, NO. S-1-SC-36395, 2018 WL 1904680, at *1; see also
Brown, 2014-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 19–20, 338 P.3d at 1282.
74. See N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13.
75. Id. (amended 2016).
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period of time by which trial is delayed by a motion for
continuance made by or on behalf of the defendant. 76
In 2014, the New Mexico Supreme Court recognized that the system of
assigning monetary bonds was contrary to state constitutional guarantees. 77 Brown
emphasized that bonds were set in amounts that corresponded to the perceived
seriousness of the offense, without a deeper inquiry into the facts and circumstances
surrounding the alleged crime. 78 More significantly, the case emphasized that the
New Mexico Constitution recognizes that some individuals should not be afforded
bail in any amount. 79 As support, the court points to the text of Article II of the New
Mexico Constitution wherein bail denial is appropriate. 80 At the time, bail could be
denied in capital cases “when the proof is evident or the presumption [against the
defendant is] great,” or when the criteria mentioned above were met. 81 In 2016, an
overwhelming majority of New Mexico voters passed a constitutional amendment
that moved the state away from cash bail and expanded the circumstances under
which a defendant could be detained pending trial. 82 The amendment left the
presumption that may be used against defendants in capital cases untouched, but
replaced the determinative criteria for bail denial in other felony cases with the
following language:
Bail may be denied by a court of record pending trial for a
defendant charged with a felony if the prosecuting authority
requests a hearing and proves by clear and convincing evidence
that no release conditions will reasonably protect the safety of any
other person or the community. A person who is not a danger
detainable on grounds of dangerousness nor a flight risk in the
absence of bond and is otherwise eligible for bail shall not be
detained solely because of financial inability to post a money or
property bond. 83
Five months after the amendment took effect, the New Mexico Supreme
Court issued its initial order in Ameer, reversing the order of the trial court that found
the defendant detainable under the capital offense exception. 84 In January 2018, the
court also issued guidance on how trial courts should make pretrial detention
determinations, including what evidentiary support must be produced by the

76. Id.
77. See generally Brown, 2014-NMSC-038, 338 P.3d 1276.
78. See generally id.
79. Id. ¶ 53, 338 P.3d at 1292.
80. Id. ¶¶ 20, 53, 338 P.3d at 1282, 1292.
81. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13 (amended 2016); see also Brown, 2014-NMSC-038, ¶ 20, 338 P.3d at
1282.
82. Maggie Shepard, New Amendment Permits ‘No Bail’ Option, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Nov. 30, 2016,
11:31
PM),
https://www.abqjournal.com/899204/new-amendment-permits-no-bail-option.html
[https://perma.cc/DXP8-UQDF].
83. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13.
84. Order, State v. Ameer, S-1-SC-36395 (N.M. May 8, 2017) (order reversing trial court pretrial
detention order based solely on capital offense exception).
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prosecution. 85 As a basis for this guidance, the court referenced what evidence is
required for bail denial in capital cases “when the proof is evident or the presumption
[against the defendant is] great.” 86 Because the court made clear that there is
essentially no difference between what evidence the prosecution must put forth in
capital cases with a presumption and cases where pretrial detention is sought under
the 2016 Constitutional Amendment, it seems as if the clear and convincing
evidentiary standard is at play in both situations, even though there is only a
presumption against the defendant in the former. 87 This is remarkably similar to what
is required by Washington D.C.’s statute, the California regulations, and the federal
system, where the clear and convincing evidentiary standard remains at play though
the defendant must overcome a rebuttable presumption working against their
release. 88
Three months later, the court issued its precedential opinion in Ameer,
holding that there are no capital offenses in New Mexico. 89 Specifically, because
“capital offense” refers to crimes that are punishable by death, and New Mexico
abolished the death penalty in 2009, the state no longer has any true capital crimes. 90
The central holding of Ameer has left New Mexico without presumptions in firstdegree murder cases. 91 Now, in what would be a capital case prior to 2018, the
prosecuting authority must file a motion for detention, and the trial court must hold
a separate hearing. 92 Prior to this shift, the request for detention could be made at
arraignment, without the separate hearing requirement. 93
The court flatly rejects the classification theory approach to pretrial
detention of defendants charged with first-degree murder, noting that the New
Mexico Legislature deemed capital punishment an inappropriate punishment for that
crime. 94 It appears as though the New Mexico Supreme Court has adopted a penalty
theory approach to release in first-degree murder cases, which emphasizes the
defendant’s risk of flight. 95 According to this theory, because capital punishment is
no longer a penalty in New Mexico, the defendant’s flight risk is diminished. 96
However, as previously discussed, just because the court has acceded to a theory as
to why defendants charged with first-degree murder should not ordinarily be
released, neither of these theories are material to criminal presumptions. Rather,
presumptions against certain classes of defendants are applied to many offenses, not
85. See generally State ex rel. Torrez v. Whitaker, 2018-NMSC-005, 410 P.3d 201.
86. Id. ¶ 92, 410 P.3d at 216.
87. See id.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(2)–(3), (f)(1)(A)–(E) (2012); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321 (West, Westlaw
through Sept. 11, 2019); S.B. 10, 2017–18 Sess. (Cal. 2018); See also DOYLE, supra note 19, at 11.
89. State v. Ameer, 2018-NMSC-030, ¶ 70, NO. S-1-SC-36395, 2018 WL 1904680, at *15 (“There
[is] no death penalty statutorily authorized for any crimes committed on or after July 1, 2009. . . . “).
90. Id. ¶¶ 69–70, 2018 WL 1904680, at *15.
91. Id.
92. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13; see Ameer, 2018-NMSC-030, ¶ 73, 2018 WL 1904680, at *15.
93. See State v. David, 1984-NMCA-119, ¶ 23, 692 P.2d 524, 527 (stating that a separate review
hearing is not required when bail is denied).
94. Ameer, 2018-NMSC-030, ¶ 61, 2018 WL 1904680, at *13.
95. See id.; see also Ex parte Dennis, 334 So. 2d 369, 371 (Miss. 1976); State v. Johnson, 294 A.2d
245, 250 (N.J. 1972); Roll v. Larson, 516 P.2d 1392, 1393 (Utah 1973).
96. See Ameer, 2018-NMSC-030, ¶ 13, 2018 WL 1904680, at *3.
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just capital crimes, in many jurisdictions and the federal court system. 97 The absence
of presumptions in New Mexico’s system of pretrial release is not Ameer’s
preeminent holding, but it happens to be a consequence of declaring the capital
offense exception moot.
The 2016 Constitutional Amendment moved New Mexico away from a
pretrial release system centered on cash bail, and towards a system of release that
treats defendants equally regardless of their financial situation. 98 For example, the
algorithm used to determine risk factors for defendants in New Mexico’s largest
county does not take into account race or socioeconomic status. 99 This is a positive
step towards fundamental fairness in the state’s pretrial release system. However, the
release of defendants charged with first-degree murder has been met with intense
public criticism. 100 Working without presumptions against defendants charged with
first-degree murder in pretrial release proceedings in New Mexico has arguably
resulted in the release of certain defendants who may have been detained had they
been required to overcome a presumption that they are a flight risk or otherwise pose
a danger to the community. 101 This has also sparked concern among lawmakers,
including the former governor, who is among those who have called for the repeal
of this amendment. 102 The current governor has noted the current pretrial release
system’s ineffectiveness. 103 A significant overhaul of the pretrial release system
would undo the progress the state has done in its move toward treating defendants
equally regardless of their ability to post a cash bond. Incorporating rebuttable
presumptions into New Mexico’s pretrial release rules, as has been done by other
cash bail reform jurisdictions, allows New Mexico to continue a pretrial release
system rooted in fairness.

97. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 9; 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(2)–(3), (f)(1)(A)–(E) (2012); D.C. CODE ANN. § 231321 (West, Westlaw through Sept. 11, 2019); S.B. 10, 2017–18 Sess. (Cal. 2018).
98. N.M. CONST. art. II § 13.
99. Ryan Boetel, Courts to Implement New Risk Assessment Tool, ALBUQUERQUE J. (May 31, 2017,
11:45PM)
https://www.abqjournal.com/1011380/courts-to-implement-new-risk-assessment-tool-forsuspects.html [https://perma.cc/Z46S-KWKF]; see also About the PSA, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND.,
https:// www.psapretrial.org/about [https://perma.cc/4BZL-88Q6] (“The PSA uses nine factors to predict
a person’s likelihood of success while on pretrial release. The factors include the person’s age, prior
convictions, pending charges, and prior failures to appear in court pretrial.”).
100. See Joshua Kellogg, Residents Hold Rally Against New Pretrial Detention Rules, FARMINGTON
DAILY
TIMES
(Sept.
18,
2017,
1:38
PM),
https://www.dailytimes.com/story/news/crime/2017/09/18/residents-hold-rally-against-new-pretrial-detentionrules/668758001/ [https://perma.cc/RMS5-UJ9U].
101. See, e.g., Katy Barnitz, Second Murder Tied to Woman out of Jail on Bond, ALBUQUERQUE J.
(July 31, 2018, 11:18 PM), https://www.abqjournal.com/1203311/prosecutors-host-of-party-was-facingmurder-charge.html [https://perma.cc/VK8B-XQ6U]; Maggie Shepard, Murder Suspect Arrested After
J.
(Apr.
27,
2018,
9:48
PM),
Missing
Court
Hearing,
ALBUQUERQUE
https://www.abqjournal.com/1164331/murder-case-suspect-fails-for-show-for-court-again.html
[https://perma.cc/D94A-Q7JH]. The defendant in the latter example was subsequently convicted of firstdegree murder and sentenced to life in prison. Woman Sentenced in May 2017 Death, ALBUQUERQUE J.,
Oct. 17, 2019, at A7.
102. Lopez, supra note 22; McKay & Shepard, supra note 22; Porter, supra note 22.
103. Ramirez, supra note 22.
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IV. THE EFFECT OF PRESUMPTIONS ON PRETRIAL RELEASE IN
NEW MEXICO
A. Pretrial Presumptions and the Prosecution’s Burden
If the New Mexico’s Rules of Criminal Procedure are amended in to include
a rebuttable presumption against defendants charged with first-degree murder, the
burden of the prosecution will not change significantly. 104 Notably, a presumption
of this sort will not run contrary to the most recent constitutional amendment’s clear
and convincing evidence standard. 105 The federal rules for pretrial release,
Washington, D.C.’s statutory scheme, and California’s bail reform regulations all
make clear that the prosecution must still make a clear and convincing evidentiary
showing of dangerousness or risk of flight, and federal caselaw has interpreted the
defendant’s burden to rebut any presumption as minimal. 106
If changes to New Mexico’s pretrial detention rules are modeled after any
of the approaches discussed above, the accused would still be entitled to a separate
pretrial detention hearing, 107 unlike the pre-Ameer requirements where defendants
charged with capital crimes and detained under the capital offense exception were
entitled only to arraignment if the prosecuting authority did not move for pretrial
detention pursuant to the 2016 Constitutional Amendment. 108 As was true prior to
Ameer, the nature of a first-degree murder charge would trigger a presumption
against the defendant. 109 This would allow the trial court to sua sponte order a
separate hearing at the accused’s first court appearance if the court believes the
defendant may pose a danger to the community or a risk of flight. Currently, the
prosecution must specifically request a separate pretrial detention hearing regardless
of the felony offense. 110 This change would comply with the 2016 Constitutional
Amendment’s mandate that a separate hearing is required in all cases when bail
denial is being considered. 111 It also comports with the New Mexico Supreme
Court’s desire to give district judges broader authority in pretrial release
determinations. 112

104. See, e.g., United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Even in a presumption
case, the government bears the ultimate burden of persuasion by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant presents a danger to the community.”); DOYLE, supra note 19, at 10.
105. Mercedes, 254 F.3d at 436; DOYLE, supra note 19, at 10.
106. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1) (2012); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322 (West, Westlaw through Sept. 11
2019); Mercedes, 254 F.3d at 436 (“[The defendant] bears a limited burden of production—not a burden
of persuasion—to rebut that presumption by coming forward with evidence that he does not pose a danger
to the community or a risk of flight.”); S.B. 10, 2017–18 Sess. (Cal. 2018).
107. See § 3142(e)(1); § 23-1321; Cal. S.B. 10.
108. See State v. David, 1984-NMCA-119, ¶ 23, 692 P.2d 524, 527 (stating that a separate review
hearing is not required when bail is denied).
109. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See State v. Ameer, 2018-NMSC-030, ¶ 71, NO. S-1-SC-36395, 2018 WL 1904680, at *15.
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B. Amending Rules of Criminal Procedure is Appropriate
The New Mexico Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules
governing the operation of state courts. 113 This is a power shared with the State
Legislature, but the final authority rests with the court. 114 Given that incorporating a
rebuttable presumption into New Mexico’s pretrial release rules simply guides how
courts are supposed to administer pretrial detention hearings, it is not substantive in
nature because the defendant’s rights are not significantly impacted. A legitimate
concern in making a rule amendment that contains a rebuttable presumption is the
rule’s ability to withstand a constitutional challenge based on the clear and
convincing evidentiary standard contained in the 2016 constitutional amendment. 115
However, the federal release model, Washington D.C.’s statute, and California’s
reform bill still require the prosecution to make the prima facie case demanded by
rebuttable presumptions to the clear and convincing evidentiary standard. 116
Additionally, three federal circuits agree that a rebuttable presumption against a
defendant can live harmoniously with the clear and convincing evidence burden that
the prosecuting authority must meet in pretrial detention hearings. 117 Furthermore,
prior to holding that the capital offense exception and accompanying presumption
cannot be used, the New Mexico Supreme Court emphasized that the evidentiary
burden borne by the prosecutor’s reliance on either the capital offense exception or
the 2016 Constitutional Amendment requiring clear and convincing evidence is
largely the same. 118 It should also be noted that the rule amendments that have
already been proposed include a type of presumption against the defendant’s
release. 119 For these reasons, an amendment to the New Mexico Rules of Criminal
Procedure adopted by the Supreme Court is an appropriate way to incorporate a
rebuttable presumption into the current pretrial detention rules.
C. Current Proposals are Insufficient or Overly Zealous
1. Permissive Inference Rule Amendment
New Mexico lawmakers have been critical of applying the same standard
of release to all felony defendants, including those charged with first-degree murder
and other serious violent crimes. 120 Among the proposals to combat the absence of
presumptions against certain offenders from New Mexico’s system of pretrial release
was an unadopted rule amendment that allows judges to make permissive inferences
113. State v. Roy, 1936-NMSC-048, ¶ 40, 60 P.2d 646, 659 (“[t]he power to provide rules of pleading,
practice, and procedure . . . is inherently ours.”).
114. See Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 1991-NMSC-002, ¶ 15, 805 P.2d 603, 607–08; see also State
ex rel. Bliss v. Greenwood, 1957-NMSC-071, ¶ 19, 315 P.2d 223, 227 (“[S]tatutory regulation[s] must
preserve to the court sufficient power to . . . administer its judicial functions.”).
115. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13.
116. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2012); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322 (West, Westlaw through Sept. 11, 2019);
S.B. 10, 2017–18 Sess. (Cal. 2018); United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001).
117. See United States v. Stone, 608 F.3d 939, 945 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Stricklin, 932 F.2d
1353, 1355 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rodriguez, 950 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1991).
118. See State ex rel. Torrez v. Whitaker, 2018-NMSC-005, ¶¶ 92–93, 410 P.3d 201, 216–17.
119. See Romero, supra note 27, at 13–14.
120. McKay, supra note 24.
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only after a defendant has been released on conditions while a felony case is pending
and the defendant is charged with another felony offense in the interim. 121 Even if a
similar rule amendment is adopted, New Mexico will not be in the position it was
prior to Ameer, and it will not be in line with other jurisdictions that have abolished
or no longer use the death penalty and have undertaken bail reform. 122 Notably, this
proposed rule amendment does nothing to directly address any felony offenses
specifically. 123 While a rule amendment of this sort may be a way to address the
concern that certain felony defendants cannot comply with release conditions, it does
not speak to the concern that individuals charged with first-degree murder should not
be eligible for release in some circumstances. Rather, it would require an individual
charged with first-degree murder and not detained to re-offend before a permissive
inference against the defendant could by employed by the court in determining if
pretrial detention is appropriate. 124
2. Further Constitutional Amendments
Other elected officials, including the District Attorney for New Mexico’s
largest county, have proposed amending the state constitution again to incorporate
rebuttal presumptions for an exceedingly wide array of offenses. 125 Significantly, the
charges are not limited to violent offenses or those carried out while in possession of
a deadly weapon, but include witness intimidation, felonies committed by
individuals completing a sentence of probation or parole for another felony, and other
crimes that researchers have found to be equivocal touchstones of an individual’s
dangerousness. 126 The list of offenses that would trigger a rebuttable presumption
under this proposed constitutional amendment is far more exhaustive than those of
the other jurisdictions discussed above. 127 Tellingly, researchers have concluded that
limiting the use of a rebuttal presumption to pretrial release proceedings in which the
defendant is charged with a crime punishable by life imprisonment would
simultaneously address public safety concerns and place New Mexico on level
ground with similarly situated jurisdictions. 128 As argued herein, this can be
accomplished without further amendment to the state constitution. 129
D. Legislative Fix Alternative
The New Mexico Legislature has certain powers to promulgate substantive
and procedural court rules. 130 As discussed above, the inclusion of a rebuttable
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Compare Romero, supra note 27, at 13–14 with Rule 5-409 NMRA.
State v. Ameer, 2018-NMSC-030, NO. S-1-SC-36395, 2018 WL 1904680.
Romero, supra note 27, at 13–14.
Id.
Katy Barnitz & Elise Kaplan, DA Torrez to Unveil New Pretrial Detention Proposal,
ALBUQUERQUE J. (May 21, 2019, 12:05AM), https://www.abqjournal.com/1318399/da-to-unveil-newpretrial-detention-proposal-ex-some-defendants-would-have-to-prove-they-should-be-released-pendingtrial.html [https://perma.cc/Q2SA-6PV5]; Reisen, supra note 25.
126. Barnitz & Kaplan, supra note 125; Reisen, supra note 25.
127. See supra Part II.
128. See Reisen, supra note 25.
129. See discussions supra Section IV.B and infra Section IV.D.
130. See Sw. Cmty. Health Servs. v. Smith, 1988-NMSC-035, ¶ 12, 755 P.2d 40, 43.
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presumption in first-degree murder cases is procedural in nature, because it directly
impacts the judiciary’s function of administering pretrial release proceedings.
Though the New Mexico Supreme Court has the final authority over procedural
rules, the legislature may enact statutory changes that include procedural rules
provided they are not in conflict with existing court rules. 131 The addition of a
rebuttable presumption in first-degree murder cases would not conflict with the
existing procedural rules, because no presumptions currently exist. 132 Adding a
rebuttable presumption is an expansion of the current procedural rules for pretrial
detention. 133 When a statutory enactment is an expansion of a procedural rule, it is
permissible. 134 Even so, the court that is subject to the procedural mechanisms
contained in the statutorily enacted rule retains the power to temper it as the court
sees necessary, provided a party is not unduly prejudiced. 135 If a rule containing a
rebuttable presumption in first-degree murder cases is relaxed by the court, the
prosecuting authority is arguably prejudiced. For this reason, a procedural rule
change adopted by the New Mexico Supreme Court is a more favorable alternative.
Lastly, while this Note argues that the addition of a rebuttable presumption is a
procedural change, it could reasonably be viewed as an issue of legal substance that
impacts the rights of the accused or articulates a general public policy. If so, the New
Mexico Legislature has broader authority to facilitate a statutory enactment that adds
rebuttable presumptions in first-degree murder cases. 136
E. The Goal of Bail Reform Survives
Members of the New Mexico Supreme Court were driving forces behind
New Mexico’s shift away from monetary bonds. 137 The court’s opinions related to
assigning bonds and determining pretrial release and detention make clear that the
court believes the severity of a crime is not a legitimate factor in determining pretrial
detention. 138 The solution proposed by this Note does not contradict that belief.
Rather, this solution requires trial court judges to conduct a deeper inquiry into the
facts and circumstances surrounding a first-degree murder charge as mandated by
the New Mexico Supreme Court in Brown. 139 If the prosecution cannot make a
persuasive clear and convincing prima facie showing that the defendant poses a
131. See Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 1991-NMSC-002, ¶ 14, 805 P.2d 603, 607.
132. See generally Rule 5-409 NMRA.
133. See generally id.
134. See Albuquerque Rape Crisis Ctr. v. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, ¶ 11, 120 P.3d 820, 824
(holding that the statutory expansion of a court rule is permissible when “expanded . . . within the
boundaries of its purpose”).
135. See Mendez, 1991-NMSC-002, ¶ 14, 805 P.2d at 607.
136. See Sw. Cmty. Health Servs. v. Smith, 1988-NMSC-035, ¶ 12, 755 P.2d 40, 43 (“this Court
should not invalidate substantive policy choices made by the legislature under the constitutional exercise
of its police powers. . . . “).
137. Dave Tomlin, NM Chief Justice Daniels Backs Bail Reform Amendment, ALBUQUERQUE J. (July
20, 2016, 8:21 AM), https://www.abqjournal.com/811174/nm-chief-justice-daniels-backs-bail-reformamendment.html [https://perma.cc/B7CB-PLL4].
138. See State v. Ameer, 2018-NMSC-030, NO. S-1-SC-36395, 2018 WL 1904680; State ex rel.
Torrez v. Whitaker, 2018-NMSC-005, 410 P.3d 201; State v. Groves, 2018-NMSC-006, 410 P.3d 193;
State v. Brown, 2014-NMSC-038, 338 P.3d 1276.
139. See generally Brown, 2014-NMSC-038, 338 P.3d 1276.
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danger or will flee if released, the court must refuse pretrial detention. 140 Likewise,
if the defendant meets his or her burden of production to overcome a rebuttable
presumption against release, the court cannot order detention. 141
The language of New Mexico’s Constitutional Amendment is similar to that
of other jurisdictions, such as Washington, D.C. 142 This is an important consideration
in gauging the success of bail reform, because Washington D.C.’s retreat from cash
bail has lasted nearly fifty years with limited amendment. 143 However, there were
growing pains, as its statutory scheme for pretrial detention in first-degree murder
cases has been amended five times since enactment. 144 The New Mexico
Constitutional Amendment’s goal of a fair system of release that detaches itself from
cash bail can be furthered if appropriate safeguards like a rebuttable presumption in
first-degree murder cases are put in place, because it puts New Mexico’s pretrial
release system in a parallel position to jurisdictions that have successfully adopted
similar measures.
CONCLUSION
The gravity of first-degree murder does not change when a jurisdiction
ceases the imposition of the death penalty as a potential sentence. Notwithstanding
the New Mexico Supreme Court’s apparent subscription to the penalty theory of why
those accused of first-degree murder are often detained pending trial, the state’s
system of pretrial release stands out among jurisdictions that have embraced bail
reform because of its absence of presumptions of dangerousness or flight risk against
defendants charged with first-degree murder. 145 Deficiencies like this have led
lawmakers to rethink the state’s approach to pretrial release, with some going as far
as calling for the repeal of New Mexico’s bail reform amendment. 146 A procedural
rule amendment, or alternatively, a legislative fix, could add a rebuttable
presumption against defendants charged with first-degree murder without undoing
the progress the state has made in its shift toward a fair system of release. This
approach addresses the safety concerns of the public and lawmakers, corresponds
with the clear and convincing evidentiary standard required under New Mexico’s
2016 Constitutional Amendment, and furthers the state Supreme Court’s goal of
giving judges expanded discretion in pretrial release decisions. 147 Furthermore, it

140. See United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001). In the federal court system, the
evidentiary standard is not the same to demonstrate flight risk. The New Mexico Constitution demands
the same standard for both flight risk and danger.
141. See id.
142. Compare N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13 with D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321 to 1325 (West, Westlaw
through Sept. 11, 2019).
143. N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 13; § 23-1322, § 23-1325.
144. See § 23-1325.
145. See State v. Ameer, 2018-NMSC-030, ¶¶ 13, 61, NO. S-1-SC-36395, 2018 WL 1904680, at *3,
*13; see, e.g., § 23-1325; S.B. 10, 2017–18 Sess. (Cal. 2018).
146. McKay & Shepard, supra note 22; see also Porter, supra note 22.
147. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13; see Ameer, 2018-NMSC-030, ¶ 71, 2018 WL 1904680, at *3.
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makes New Mexico’s system of release more analogous to those in jurisdictions
whose bail reform approaches helped shaped the state’s amendment. 148

148. See State ex rel. Torrez v. Whitaker, 2018-NMSC-005, ¶ 70, 410 P.3d 201, 213; see also 18
U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A)–(E) (2012); § 23-1321 to 1322, § 23-1325.

